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In October 2022, as Rishi Sunak assumed office as British prime minister, he was the fifth consecutive UK leader to take up the role in six years.

Unleashed on the UK by Britain's EU exit, this signified exceptional governmental instability. So how might we describe what is unfolding in the French Republic, now on its sixth prime minister in 24 months – three of them in the past 10 months?

The current premier, the newly reinstated Sébastien Lecornu, may have gained a brief respite on that day, sacrificing Emmanuel Macron’s flagship pensions overhaul in exchange for support from Socialist lawmakers as the cost of his government’s survival.

But it is, in the best case, a short-term solution. The EU’s number two economic power is trapped in a political permacrisis, the likes of which it has not experienced for decades – possibly not since the start of its Fifth Republic in 1958 – and from which there seems no simple way out.

Governing Without a Majority

Essential context: ever since Macron called an risky early parliamentary vote in 2024, France has had a hung parliament separated into three opposing factions – the left, far right and his own centre-right alliance – without any group holding a clear majority.

At the same time, the nation faces twin financial emergencies: its national debt level and budget shortfall are now nearly double the EU threshold, and strict legal timelines to approve a 2026 budget that starts controlling expenditures are nigh.

In this challenging environment, both Lecornu’s immediate predecessors – Michel Barnier, who lasted from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who took office from December 2024 to September 2025 – were removed by parliament.

In September, the leader named his close ally Lecornu as his new prime minister. But when, a little over two weeks ago, Lecornu unveiled his new cabinet – which turned out to be much the same as the old one – he faced fury from both supporters and rivals.

To such an extent that the next day, he resigned. After only 27 days as premier, Lecornu became the briefest-serving prime minister in recent French history. In a dignified speech, he cited political rigidity, saying “partisan attitudes” and “certain egos” would make his job all but impossible.

A further unexpected development: just hours after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron requested he remain for another 48 hours in a final attempt to salvage cross-party backing – a mission, to put it mildly, filled with challenges.

Next, two ex-prime ministers publicly turned on the struggling leader. Meanwhile, the far-right National Rally (RN) and leftist LFI refused to meet Lecornu, vowing to reject any and every new government unless there were early elections.

Lecornu stuck at his job, engaging with all willing listeners. At the end of his 48 hours, he appeared on television to say he thought “a solution remained possible” to avoid elections. The leader's team announced the president would name a fresh premier 48 hours later.

Macron kept his promise – and on Friday reappointed Sébastien Lecornu. So this week – with Macron commenting from the wings that the nation's opposing groups were “creating discord” and “entirely to blame for the turmoil” – was Lecornu’s critical test. Would he endure – and can he pass that vital budget?

In a critical address, the 39-year-old PM spelled out his budget priorities, giving the Socialist party, who oppose Macron’s controversial pension changes, what they were expecting: Macron’s flagship reform would be suspended until 2027.

With the right-wing LR already on board, the Socialists said they would refuse to support no-confidence motions tabled against Lecornu by the extremist factions – meaning the administration would likely endure those ballots, scheduled for Thursday.

It is, nevertheless, by no means certain to be able to pass its planned €30bn budget squeeze: the PS explicitly warned that it would be seeking more concessions. “This,” said its leader, Olivier Faure, “is only the beginning.”

A Cultural Shift

The problem is, the more Lecornu cedes to the centre-left, the more he will meet resistance from the centre-right. And, similar to the Socialists, the right-leaning parties are themselves divided over how to handle the new government – some are still itching to topple it.

A glance at the parliamentary arithmetic shows how difficult his mission – and future viability – will be. A total of 264 deputies from the far-right RN, LFI, Greens, Communists and UDR want him out.

To achieve that, they need a 288-vote majority in parliament – so if they can persuade just 24 of the PS’s 69 deputies or the LR’s 47 representatives (or both) to vote with them, Macron’s fifth unstable premier in 24 months is, similar to his forerunners, finished.

Most expect this to occur soon. Even if, by some miracle, the dysfunctional assembly musters collective will to pass a budget by year-end, the outlook afterward look bleak.

So is there a way out? Early elections would be doubtful to resolve the issue: polls suggest nearly all parties except the RN would see reduced representation, but there would still be no clear majority. A new prime minister would confront identical numerical challenges.

Another possibility might be for Macron himself to resign. After winning the presidential election, his successor would dissolve parliament and hope to secure a parliamentary majority in the following election. But this also remains unclear.

Surveys show the future president will be Le Pen or Bardella. There is at least an strong possibility that French electorate, having chosen a far-right leader, might reconsider giving them parliamentary power.

Ultimately, France may not escape its predicament until its politicians acknowledge the changed landscape, which is that clear majorities are a thing of the past, winner-takes-all no longer applies, and compromise is not synonymous with failure.

Many think that transformation will not be feasible under the country’s current constitution. “This is no conventional parliamentary crisis, but a crise de régime” that will prove anything but temporary.

“The regime … was never designed to facilitate – and even disincentivizes – the formation of ruling alliances common in the rest of Europe. The Fifth Republic could be in its final stage.”